MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif. --- The unmanned aerial systems (UASs) market accounted for $5.25 billion of the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD's) budget in 2010, with the Air Force emerging as the highest spender among all U.S. military services. Most of the $2.42 billion the Air Force has earmarked for UAS spending in 2012 is for the procurement of the MQ-9 Predator. New analysis from Frost & Sullivan's DoD Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) research finds that fiscal year (FY) 2011 government contracts awarded specifically for the DoD UAS market amounted to $3.78 billion. Programs receiving the most contract dollars included the ER/MP MQ-1 Gray Eagle, MQ-9, and RQ-4 UASs. According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), U.S. forces will need to continue improving intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and defenses to counter non-state actors that have access to advanced technologies and information operations. UASs will be central to this effort. "Current ground wars and nation-building activities in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen drive the need for UAS resources and their diverse mission capabilities," said Frost & Sullivan Senior Industry Analyst Michael Blades. "Even the current troop withdrawal from Iraq may not significantly reduce the UAS requirement, as military and political leaders recognize the deterrent effect of unmanned platforms." Further, a Defense Science Board Task Force report titled, "Counterinsurgency (COIN) ISR Operations" has red flagged 24 countries that could pose COIN challenges to the United States. Any involvement in COIN operations requires UAS assets. Despite their utility, UASs have unresolved technical issues relating to data transfer, such as communications security, spectrum management and bandwidth usage. DoD UAS platforms have to encrypt and transmit or receive data across dedicated frequency spectrums to minimize cross-channel interference. Technical challenges arise when marrying size, weight and power (SWaP) requirements to frequency bands, as both affect the range and bandwidth capabilities of communications between ISR platforms and their end users. "Companies that can create and manufacture modular, multi-mission, SWaP-efficient UAS sensors and subsystems will remain competitive," said Blades. "Small UAS companies will need partnerships with larger companies, exposure to DoD contracts, or unique technologies to survive until the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) irons out rules and regulations for UAS operation in the National Airspace System (NAS)." Some specific areas of growth for UAS manufacturers are affordable, miniaturized, automatic flight-control systems; sense-and-avoid technologies; redundant sensor/control systems; total systems integration; communications solutions; and data-exploitation efficiencies. Frost & Sullivan works in collaboration with clients to leverage visionary innovation that addresses the global challenges and related growth opportunities that will make or break today's market participants. -ends-

PATUXENT RIVER, Md. --- In recent months, Pax River personnel may have noticed a new, uniquely shaped tailless aircraft on the runway, the X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstrator (UCAS-D). “This summer will be full of activity as the team braces for X-47B’s first flight here and arrival of the second X-47B air vehicle from Edwards Air Force Base, Calif.,” said Matt Funk, UCAS-D lead test engineer. “In the coming months, you can expect to see the X-47B flying over the base and surrounding area along the Chesapeake Bay.” The X-47B is the first unmanned vehicle designed to take off and land on an aircraft carrier. As part of the program’s demonstration, the X-47B will perform arrested landings and catapult launches at Pax to validate its ability to conduct precision approaches to the carrier. The base is one of only a few sites in the world where the Navy can run performance tests on aircraft-carrier catapult operations at a land-based facility with flight test and engineering support resources not available on a ship. "Testing at Pax River is a critical component of this demonstration program as we break new ground with the development of a carrier-based unmanned air system,” said Capt. Jaime Engdahl, Navy UCAS program manager. “The integrated test team (ITT), under leadership of AIR-5.0 [Test and Evaluation] and VX-23 [Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 23], are critical members of the Navy UCAS program team that will make this program a success.” Since the arrival of the first X-47B in late 2011, the UCAS-D ITT has been preparing the aircraft for its initial flight at Pax River. Recently, the X-47B performed taxi testing to validate the overall reliability of the system. The team also conducted tests to determine the aircraft's ability to catch an arresting wire on an aircraft carrier. Like manned aircraft, the air vehicle is scheduled to begin six weeks of electronic vulnerability testing at the Naval Electromagnetic Radio Facility (NERF). This test verifies there are no electrical disturbance, signal, or emission issues that cause an undesired response or malfunction of a subsystem or component. After completing standard ground tests and system check-outs, the program anticipates several major milestones here beginning with first flight. “We are all excited to have a new groundbreaking aircraft here as part of our test program, but as always the Navy puts safety first,” Engdahl said. Funk added that while shape and design of the X-47B are unique and eye-catching, it is critical that spectators follow base policy and keep a safe distance from the flight line during all X-47B taxi and flight operations. Engdahl is optimistic about the program’s planned flight test program, including F/A-18 and King Air surrogate aircraft and X-47B testing this fall. “The program is progressing well in preparation for shore-based catapult launch testing and arrested landings, leading ultimately to our final carrier demonstration in 2013,” Engdahl said. -ends-

U.S. Air Force Captain Keric D. Clanahan has written a paper on the legal and policy controversies surrounding the Air Force's use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), more commonly known as drones. Specifically, Clanahan examines the kinds of tasks contractors are performing in the Air Force's drone program and discusses whether these tasks should be entrusted to contractors. Drones have profoundly changed the nature of warfare in the last few years. The drone program greatly depends on private contractors, from drone manufacturer General Atomics to the hundreds of employees of companies like SAIC and BAE Systems who help the Air Force conduct drone missions. According to Clanahan, the U.S. military’s fleet of drones has grown from 167 in 2002 to over 7,000 in 2011, and the Air Force plans to acquire hundreds more over the next few years at a total cost that will exceed $20 billion. Clanahan argues that government personnel should perform many of the roles necessary to sustain the drone program because they are inherently governmental functions, or functions which must be performed by federal civilian or military employees. Clanahan is somewhat vague about whether contractors in the program are performing or have performed inherently governmental functions, stating only that “there have been situations” where contractors might have crossed the line and either commanded military forces or participated in combat operations, activities which would be in violation of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the White House’s 2011 policy letter on inherently governmental functions. What is certain, however, is that contractors in the drone program are performing tasks that are closely associated with inherently governmental functions, such as drone intelligence processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED), and “critical” tasks, such as drone maintenance and repair. (Critical functions, a category introduced in the White House policy letter, are functions that are core to an agency’s mission, over which it must maintain sufficient internal capability.) Clanahan describes the Air Force’s reliance on contractors in the drone program as “excessive,” especially with regard to maintenance and repair, and warns that the Air Force must always remain cautious of contractors exerting undue influence over inherently governmental areas. In his words, “it is imperative that the Air Force prevent contractors from getting too close to the tip of the spear.” Clanahan believes Congress can play a key role in preventing drone program contractors from crossing the line. He recommends that Congress statutorily define what drone activities may and may not be contracted. However, in the heat of battle, an arbitrarily drawn line between inherently governmental and non-inherently governmental functions can easily erode. The FAR acknowledges this problem: [C]ertain services and actions that are not considered to be inherently governmental functions may approach being in that category because of the nature of the function, the manner in which the contractor performs the contract, or the manner in which the government administers contractor performance. A more effective solution proposed by Clanahan is for Congress to provide the Air Force with the funds needed to develop a workforce of government employees (mostly military) sufficient in size and training to be able to take over the majority of roles in the drone program. Currently, the Air Force relies too heavily on contractors to completely jettison them from the program. (This reliance could grow as a result of recent efforts to eliminate thousands of civilian Air Force jobs.) The best we can hope for is the Air Force quickly finding the proper contractor/government personnel balance to ensure program missions are met while contractors are kept well away from “the tip of the spear.” -ends-

Insitu, Inc., Bingen, Wash., is being awarded a $35,507,379 modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-11-C-0061) for additional operational and maintenance services in support of the ScanEagle unmanned aerial system. These services will provide electro-optical/infrared and mid-wave infrared imagery in support of land-based operations in Operation Enduring Freedom to provide real-time imagery and data. Work will be performed in Bingen, Wash., and is expected to be completed in December 2012. Contract funds in the amount of $35,507,379 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity. -ends-

A test arena for the standardized examination of mobile robots was opened on 3 April 2012 at the Bundeswehr Technical Center for Engineer and General Field Equipment (WTD 51) in Koblenz. The standardized test elements allow the individual properties of the mobile systems to be recorded in a reproducible way. For example, the climbing capability, the obstacle crossing ability, the maximum period of use and many other parameters are recorded separately. As the tests are always conducted under the same conditions, the data can be compared right away even if different robots are tested at different locations. The collection of standardized test methods is available in the USA, in Japan and now in Germany as well. The elements were developed over the past few years by Adam Jacoff of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the USA and have already been successfully used several times in procurement processes of the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the US Army. Requirements for the robots to be procured were determined by means of a selection of test methods which then had to be completed with certain parameters. Jacoff introduced the methodology in a presentation and gave an overview of the measurement results of the robots already tested. In addition, he gave an impression of the way ahead regarding the test methods currently under development. Here, the focus is on the area of mobile manipulation and directed perception, for example in order to inspect the interior of a truck cabin using a robot. As of now, the test arena is available in Koblenz for the evaluation of robots. In addition, it can be used for the systematic training of robot operators. -ends-

On May 2-3, the reception flights for the S-100 Camcopter drone, also designated Serval, took place aboard the offshore patrol vessel L’Adroit. They confirmed the system’s overall performance, and renewed the operating clearances of the operators from the CEPA/10S squadron. The first phase of the Serval user trials, which will be carried out by CEPA/10S in cooperation with DGA’s flight test department, will begin on May 10, when L’Adroit will sail on its initial fisheries patrol mission. During this cruise, evaluation flights will be carried out using the Thales AGILE2 electro-optical sensor ball. They are intended to confirm the performance of the integrated system, to define the flight envelope of the unmanned aircraft, and to validate and refine procedures for drone operations in a shipboard environment. -ends-

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., Poway, Calif., was awarded a $141,832,994 cost-plus-incentive-fee contract. The award will provide for the services in support of the MQ-1C Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft systems. Work will be performed in Poway, Calif., with an estimated completion date of May 7, 2013. One bid was solicited, with one bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala., is the contracting activity (W58RGZ-12-C-0075). -ends-

HELMAND PROVINCE, Afghanistan --- Improvised explosive devices have changed the way the Marine Corps engages hostile forces. The need has risen for supplies to reach the most remote parts of Afghanistan quickly, reliably and safely. Late last year, the Corps began experimenting with the K-MAX - an unmanned helicopter, able to transport large amounts of cargo and reduce the need for convoys. With troops spread across a desolate country with few paved roads, steep mountains, rocky terrain and abrasive weather, the K-MAX has arrived to help deliver supplies across the harsh lands of Afghanistan. Presently, convoys are exposed to many potential dangers, such as improvised explosive devices and ambushes. Both have claimed the lives of Marines in the past. “The need [for an alternate transport solution] came about because the Marine Corps wanted to get trucks off the road,” said Maj. Kyle O’Connor, the detachment officer in charge for Cargo Resupply Unmanned Aircraft Systems [CRUAS], a component of Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1. “They wanted to be able to deliver supplies from one locale to another without putting Marines in danger of IED’s,” he said. “The Marine Corps needed a fast, reliable platform with which to deliver to COPs [Combat Outposts].” The K-MAX platform has a unique configuration. The two sets of rotors are mounted side-by-side and turn in opposite directions. Each rotor on the helicopter is mounted at a slight angle to the other so that the blades can spin simultaneously without colliding. This configuration allows for superior stability and power while eliminating the need for a tail rotor. K-MAX has, thus far, fulfilled the Corps’ request of transporting large amounts of cargo over great distances in an expeditious manner. O’Connor explained that in the month of March alone, the K-MAX ferried approximately 500,000 pounds of cargo and has transported more than 1.3 million pounds since its arrival five months ago. It has flown roughly 400 missions in theater. O’Connor said the K-MAX has performed so well that the original six-month trial has been extended in theater. “It’s such a new system for the DoD [Department of Defense] that there isn’t a whole lot of reliability data for it,” he said. “Since it’s done so well, the deployment extension is going to give us more time to continue to gather data on its performance and transport more cargo.” The data collected will give Corps officials insight on whether to keep the K-MAX as a permanent addition to the Corps’ unmanned squadrons. “We’re flying to see if there are any issues and see if problems come up,” O’Connor said. While data is being collected, new tactics, techniques and procedures have been created to weave the K-MAX into everyday operations across Helmand province. Sgt. Trevor Scarberry, an Air Vehicle Operator with CRUAS said he has helped create new procedures for the aircraft. “Since no one has done this and it’s all brand new, we’re having to develop new ways of doing things,” said Scarberry, of Choctaw, Okla. He said new procedures have been implemented for safety, landing zone and air space coordination. One such procedure ensures the safety of ground crews unloading the K-MAX once it reaches its destinations. The intermeshing duel rotors spin within a few feet of the ground and surrounding personnel must be keenly aware of the down tilt of the rotor blades. Even though the K-MAX is still in its trial run, Scarberry said he is very pleased with the performance of the aircraft. “The precision of the system is amazing,” he said. “I’ve been impressed and surprised.” In addition to resupplying units on the ground, the K-MAX will also support the reduction of international troops. While NATO forces prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan, the K-MAX will be working alongside them. “As the drawdown occurs, there will be fewer vehicles and a greater demand for air transportation,” O’Connor said. “With K-MAX being extended, we hope to use it to assist in retrograde operations.” O’Connor added since February, the K-MAX has helped retrograde equipment from several combat outposts and will likely continue these types of operations in the future. -ends-

BAE Systems has taken a step closer to removing pilots from fighter jets by launching the first major test flights for a new generation of intelligent drone aircraft. The defence group is assessing software for unmanned aircraft that will operate with an unprecedented level of independence. Defence experts believe pilotless planes are the next progression from manned fighters such as the Typhoon jet, made by BAE. The project, named Astraea, differs from the current drone models in use in Afghanistan, which are flown remotely by pilots on the ground. Instead the prototypes will follow a set of programmed instructions, with the aim that they could fly difficult missions autonomously for days at a time. BAE is using a conventional aircraft – an 18-seater Jetstream propeller plane – for the flights over the Irish Sea and will have technicians on board. The Jetstream will fly autonomously during some tests but there will be a pilot at the controls at all times, ready to take over if there is a problem. The tests will include a collision avoidance trial, using a light aircraft that will gauge the plane's ability to dodge potential hazards. A BAE spokesperson said: "This will demonstrate to regulators such as the Civil Aviation Authority and air traffic control service providers the progress made towards achieving safe routine use of UAVs [unmanned air vehicle] in UK airspace." The test flights started at the beginning of the month and will run until September, and are taking place in controlled airspace. The Astraea programme is run by a consortium whose members include BAE and other UK companies such as Cobham, Qinetiq and Rolls-Royce. Thales, the French defence and security group, is also a member. (end of excerpt) Click here for the full story, on The Guardian website. -ends-

Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Integrated Systems Sector, San Diego, Calif., is being awarded a $25,709,758 modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-07-C-0041) to purchase three Fire Scout vertical takeoff and landing tactical unmanned aerial vehicles Lot 5 low rate initial production and one ground control station. Work will be performed in Moss Point, Miss. (55 percent), and San Diego, Calif. (45 percent), and is expected to be completed in December 2013. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command is the contracting activity. -ends-

On March 12 a US drone strike in Waziristan killed 15 militants including two senior commanders of the Mullah Nazir faction of the Tehrik-e-Taliban. This was the ninth drone strike in 2012 and many more such strikes are expected in the coming weeks and months. On March 20, the all-party parliamentary committee in Pakistan called for an end to US drone attacks as well as to “hot pursuit or boots” on Pakistani territory, declaring them as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty. The committee has also rejected the US offer of providing advance notice for drone attacks and limiting the types of likely targets. In fact, the idea of advance notice appears to be a desperate attempt by the US to avoid a total stoppage of its drone operations; hitherto, it has been highly secretive about its drone operations in order to prevent any last minute tip off to the militants by elements in the Pakistani intelligence establishment. Notwithstanding the 2010 Wikileaks cables’ claims that the drone strikes have the tacit seal of approval of the Pakistani government and the military, they have indeed generated extensive agitation and anti-Americanism in Pakistan. According to the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), over 220 civilians have already been killed in drone strikes since 2004, although the American Foundation puts this figure at over 700—sufficient to arouse public sentiments and government sensitivities. Further, the PIPS data also notes that the US has eliminated over 2500 suspected militants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden, Ilyas Kashmiri, Baitullah Mehsud and Nek Muhammad in drone operations. Clearly, the drones have yielded rich dividends for the US. Undoubtedly, the drones have heralded a new dawn in warfare: strike from a safe distance and with any troop commitment whatsoever. In fact, the global production of drones has reportedly risen and more and more states are inducting them into their inventory. A drone aircraft is a lethal piece of weaponry, which hovers overhead, unseen and unnoticed, and approaches its target silently and strikes with precision. It is a perfect device for surgical strikes. However, its increased use and success in the war on terror has sparked an international debate over the legality of its use and has raised three key questions: How lawful is this new form of warfare under international law? Are US drone strikes against terrorist groups a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty? What rights and responsibilities do the injured state (the US or India) and host state (Pakistan) have should non-state actors (NSAs) continue to operate with impunity? The Jihadi infrastructure in Pakistan continues to thrive with close linkages with the state organs (military and ISI). This indicates not only the state’s acquiescence to the unconstrained activities of non-state actors but also its unwillingness to rein in these “strategic assets” in contravention of UNGA resolution 2625(XXV) which establishes state responsibility to refrain from supporting acts of terrorism. The ISI’s ‘double game’ has been a major reason for the growing mistrust between Pakistan and the US and the suspension of US financial assistance on several occasions. Last year, for instance, the US had deferred $800 million because of charges about the ISI’s complicity in the killing of journalist Saleem Shehzaad who was investigating the infiltration of extremist elements in the military and the ISI. The US urging of Pakistan to persuade Hamid Gul, the ex-ISI chief, to ask Mullah Umar to leave Pakistan is another instance of the ISI’s continued linkages with these groups. The testimony of David Coleman Headley also indicates the involvement of Pakistan’s state organs in supporting terrorist activities by non-state actors. These linkages are deep and are proving hard to dismantle. Under these circumstances, what can the US or India do and who is accountable for the acts of non-state actors? According to article 8 of the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility (ILCASR), “The conduct of a person or a group shall be considered an act of a state under international law if the person or the group of person is in fact acting on the instruction of, or under the direction or control of that state in carrying out the conduct.” Some past International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases are also instructive from the perspective of attributability (of NSA acts), state obligation (towards NSA acts), self defence (of the injured state), necessity (for the punitive action) and proportionality (of the punitive action). In the Genocide Case, the ICJ had ruled that because of want of evidence the genocide of Bosnians by the Serbian army could not be attributed to the state and therefore the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) could not be targeted. But it went on to note that nonetheless it was the obligation of FRY, given its considerable influence on the Serbian army, to prevent the genocide, a task in which it had failed. In the Nicaragua vs the United States of America case, the ICJ stated that in order to legitimate the US support for the Contras against the Nicaraguan government and military, the armed attacks by Nicaragua-based rebel groups against El Salvador needed to be attributable to the Nicaraguan state. Since this cannot be done, the targeting of the Nicaraguan government and military by the US-supported contras was unlawful. In the Democratic Republic of Congo vs Uganda case, the ICJ ruled that since the attacks carried out by anti-Ugandan rebels operating from the territory of the DRC were not attributable to the DRC, Uganda had no right to use force in self- defence against the DRC. In other words, the rebels should have been the target and not the government. What do these judgments imply in the Pakistani context? First, in order to target the state, the wrongful acts of the non-state actors must be “attributable” to the state. Although a majority of the acts of the non-state actors in Pakistan are attributable to the state organs, the US is not targeting the state and is only surgically targeting militant hideouts, barring occasional unintended and misdirected strikes. Second, in targeting the militants, the US does not violate Pakistan’s sovereignty because there is an exception available to the state’s right of territorial sovereignty under customary international law. The UNGA resolution 2625 clearly establishes state responsibility to refrain from supporting acts of terrorism, failing which the injured state(s) can exercise the right of self-defence to protect its interest and citizens, which is also specified by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Third, Article 51 provides that the case for targeting non-state actors rests on compliance with the requirements of necessity and proportionality. In Pakistan’s case, US actions in the form of drone attacks are in compliance with necessity (since political and diplomatic options have been exhausted in convincing the Pakistani state to rein in these groups), and proportionality (strikes are targeted at the militant hideouts in a localised area and not at government troops or installations. And, fourth, the ICJ ruling implies that Pakistan, the host state for non-state actors, cannot escape responsibility towards the acts of NSAs whether they are committed with or without its knowledge, and that it must do everything in its capacity to rein in these groups. The mere denial of state involvement is not sufficient. Thus, drone strikes constitute an effective and lawful response if they are carried out within the bounds of the above provisions. Dr Ashutosh Misra, an IDSA Alumni, is working as Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS), Mt Gravatt campus, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia. -ends-

excerpted from a speech delivered by Peter Luff, Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, at Snecma Propulsion Solide (SAFRAN Group), Bordeaux, on Friday 16 March 2012. UAS: Unmanned Air Systems And SMEs are of course essential to making sure we continue to push forward the boundaries in a sector like aerospace, where the ability to exploit new and emerging technologies will be absolutely vital. The potential here is, I believe, hugely exciting. Unmanned air systems are now an absolutely crucial asset, both in today’s battle space and as a vital capability for the future. We know this from our operations in Afghanistan, and again of course Libya was another example. Last month’s UK-France summit committed us to taking forward our planned co-operation on UAS within a long term partnership framework that encompasses the different levels. From tactical to ‘Medium altitude long endurance’ (MALE) in the mid term, and unmanned combat air systems in the longer term. Joint funding and interdependence should help sustain industrial capability and deliver cost savings. Work is proceeding at pace and industry input will be important. On MALE we now have a joint office in Bristol and our next step will be to advance the jointly funded risk reduction studies for the MALE. We will look to take further decisions after the outcomes of the study. I’d like to say a word here about Watchkeeper. We welcome French interest in acquiring this unmanned aerial capability, and we are looking at opportunities to organise trials in France next year. I think both sides agree there is a lot of mutual benefit to be had when it comes to co-operating on this system. Watch this space, as they say. Unmanned combat air system The next couple of years are going to be very busy. And it will be a period of vital importance, I believe, when it comes to shaping the future of European combat air. Looking ahead to when Rafale and Typhoon come out of service in the 2030+ timeframe, both the UK and France will have a requirement to examine the options for the next generation of combat air systems. Strong correlation has been found between UK and French needs and aspirations in the combat air sector. A common vision on the ‘Combat Air’ sector has been shared, and is being developed, between governments. This should ensure that we have the necessary skills and technological capbilities to take development forward of this complex military air system. Next year we intend the UK and France to undertake a joint ‘Future combat air system demonstration programme’. Pending national approvals and decisions points on both sides, we’ll be starting work as soon as possible on a specification for this demonstration. There will be a jointly funded contract under the industrial leadership of our national fighter aircraft industries. This will need both an investment in the right technologies and of course the skills required. Again, those of you here today from industry have an important stake in this. Opportunities for business will exist across the supply chain and we will be looking to you for your support. (end of excerpt) Click here for the full text of the speech. -ends-

I wish to briefly address here how drones, and specifically Reaper, provide a good example of how our poor selection of modern weapons makes our defenses more expensive and less effective--and lead to further, deeper decay. (Others and I have written about how more money has led to a shrinking, aging, less ready to fight American military. If you want samples of those writings, just ask.) The counterintuitive trend (more money buys less defense) has frequently been explained by the ever growing price of weapons, mostly in terms of what is termed "cost growth" as measured by GAO. It has also been explained by the above inflation growth in the cost of each member of the armed forces. While many see DOD healthcare and military retirement as the problem, it has also, perhaps even mostly, occurred in indiscriminate pay raises, the top heavy nature of our armed forces, extraneous (but expensive) benefits like concurrent receipt and World War II survivors' benefits, and other costs. There are yet to come huge cost increases for benefits for veterans of the recent and ongoing wars. The Washington DC conventional wisdom seems to hold that just minor changes in DOD healthcare and convening a blue ribbon commission to tweak down military retirement will fix the overall DOD manpower cost problem. Of course, it will not. The hardware end of today's conventional conventional wisdom seems to believe similarly that only minor pain is needed, such as the cancellation of a few secondary programs (like the block 30 version of Global Hawk) and some short-term delays in a few major programs (like the F-35 and submarine production). But, surely no change in the fundamental course is necessary. Indeed, new equipment will bring such dramatic improvements in performance that more capability can be had, even if the costs go up and the inventory goes down, or so the argument goes. The penultimate example is the F-22: while it's cost is truly extraordinary (over $400 million per airplane in 2011 dollars according to GAO), its widely accepted reputation is that it brings such vast capability that the purchase is not an act of self-destruction. (The case that the F-22 is a huge mistake, even a step backward, has been made and will be made again.) We heard the same case being made on drones: the costs are minor and even if they are more than we are initially told, they bring such dramatically increased capabilities that we can get more for less. Reaper , for example, was described almost universally as both cheap and a major step forward in capability, and it did so with only minor cost overruns, unlike the F-22. The leap ahead in capability was so dramatic that the rhetoric surrounding it was even more "groundbreaking" than the descriptions of the F-22, where the claimed improvements were more evolutionary. Setting aside the F-22 for later analysis, the case for the MQ-9 has fallen flat on its face. It is more, not less, expensive to own and operate than analogous aircraft, and its performance is actually quite pathetic compared to manned aircraft. On one measure, it could not even compete effectively with a rudimentary Cessna aircraft. In addition to exacerbating the more money buys less defense syndrome, the MQ-9 and drones like it introduce other forms of decay into our armed forces: pilots are drawn out of the manned aircraft force to fly drones where their manned aircraft skills are not only lost temporarily while the pilot is sidetracked but decay permanently--as any pilot will tell you. Moreover, with a new career path opening up in the Air Force and Navy for "flying" drones, what will happen to the highly perishable skills of combat pilots--not just the ones who go fly drones but the ones who stay with aircraft but are no longer exercising what are perceived as the premier in-air skill? Their training and readiness budget has been declining for years; it will decline more sharply now. If ever we are forced to fight an enemy whose skies are actually defended by working equipment with competent operators, what is going to happen to the American campaign after the skies are swept clean of hapless drones and the decayed skills of our available human operators, ignored for years, confronts American political and military commanders with some very ugly choices? We are also growing an American political and military culture that sees warfare as a readily acceptable policy option that means no unforeseen consequences at home and nothing but mission success abroad. The selection of incompetent, unprepared and/or unequipped enemies, unable to respond effectively, has enabled this thinking. Now we believe we have the ultimate weapon that does not even risk our military personnel; we guarantee ourselves success--even if it is a little grisly on the receiving end--and we presume no threat we can't stop to the homeland. Anything else would come to Americans as a gigantic surprise, especially given how policy makers and prognosticators have presented the options. War rarely comes without surprises; we are setting ourselves up for a long series of unpleasant ones. Considering these more important issues starts with a better understanding of the simplistic ones. Start below with the simple question of the MQ-9 Reaper's physical performance. Note the web of money and policy entanglements that are spun around it. I urge you to then consider the deeper, longer range implications. Click here for the full article, plus links to previous parts in the series, on the CDI website. or Click here for the entire series (24 pages in PDF format) on the WSI website. -ends-

Not only are drones, such as Reaper, far more expensive to buy and operate than analogous aircraft (explained here); not only are they extremely limited in searching for and identifying valid targets--significantly less so than even primitive manned aircraft (explained here); but also Reaper and Predator don't get into the air very often, and when they do, they frequently seem to end up pranged--crashed. As many as 100, perhaps even more, Predators and Reaper may have crashed or are otherwise out of the inventory. And, the Air Force's data on flying hours suggests that a single Reaper air vehicle (or a Predator) gets into the air no more than once or twice a week. Yet again, manned aircraft dramatically outperform these drones, on both dimensions. The grim data on Reaper (and Predator) crashes are suggested by the the production and inventory numbers of both, and while the available data on official and publically reported "mishaps" are quite incomplete, they also suggest a real and continuing problem. To confirm or disprove the suggested disastrous crash rate, a thorough and independent audit of each Reaper (and Predator) produced is clearly necessary. Given the unbridled advocacy of Predator and Reaper in places like the House Armed Services Committee and the other congressional "defense" committees and given the incompleteness of officially reported Air Force and DOD data, one clearly needs to look elsewhere for that job to be done, objectively and completely. 4. Keeping Track of the Drones Predator purchases ended in 2009, with a total of 248 being bought by the Air Force.[1] Reaper purchases started in 2002, rose from four per year in 2004 to 48 per year in 2011, yielding a 108-strong Reaper fleet authorized by the end of 2010, with 48 more to be bought in both 2011 and 2012.[2] Previous plans for combined Predator and Reaper production had been to support 65 CAPs (four air vehicles each) by 2013.[3] However, 2013 budget materials clarified that the 65 CAPs would not be complete until later, variously stated to be either 2014[4] or 2017.[5] Air Force budget documents for 2013 assert that by the end of 2011 there were 60 Predator/Reaper CAPs,[6] implying a total count of Predators and Reapers of 240. It seems like some of the Pentagon's drones are missing. (end of excerpt) Click here for the rest of the story, on the CDI website. -ends-

The jargon these days is "ISR" (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), and it is a key function for drones, such as Reaper. In fact, it is the underlying reason for them. Surely, it must be, for as we have already seen, the MQ-9 Reaper is significantly more expensive to buy and operate than analogous manned aircraft (according to official Air Force and DOD cost data), it cannot survive in defended airspace, and it carries a meager payload of just two types of weapons. Today's part of this series addresses what turns out to be Reaper's extremely limited ability to find and identify valid targets. The simple fact is that some of the technologies Reaper uses for sensing targets is are simply not working and in other cases longstanding problems have not been solved. How bad is it? See the discussion below comparing Reaper not to modern combat aircraft but to a primitive Cessna aircraft with sensor technology far cheaper than Reaper's. Readers may also be interested to learn that this entire series on Reaper was peer-reviewed by some highly qualified technical experts, including three serving DOD officials (and one retiree) with significant responsibilities for drone performance and/or operations. In each case, the experts specifically reviewed the material that follows on Reaper's "ISR" capabilities (and the analysis on crash rate to be published tomorrow). These officials had no quarrel with the series' analysis and findings, except to say in one case that a drone (other than Reaper) did not have difficulty tracking a human target once located and identified by other means. In commenting on the series summation, to be published Friday, this same commenter asserted "totally agree," all in CAPs. 3. Finding the Right Targets Many argue the most critical payload Reaper carries is sensors for finding targets and collecting information that is made available to operators on the ground. The current version of the Reaper has a "Multi-Spectral Targeting System" that combines infrared and optical sensors and a laser designator/range finder to employ Hellfire missiles and laser guided bombs. But the ability of these sensors to identify targets-to discern just what they are, based on the clarity and resolution of the imagery received on the ground-has serious limitations. (end of excerpt) Click here for the rest of the story, on the CDI website. -ends-

The second of my series on the MQ-9 Reaper drone at Time's Battleland blog is on the subject of cost and some measures of performance. The conventional wisdom, widely reported in the press, is that drones, such as Reaper, are cheaper to buy and operate than manned aircraft. That "wisdom" is badly misinformed. The cost comparisons are not even close. Find the first part of this series--on Reaper basics and pundits' rhetoric on drones--from Monday at http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2012/02/27/1-the-reaper-revolution-revisited/. Tomorrow's part of the series addresses the performance dimension of Reaper (and drones in general) that many regard as their most important and their biggest advantage over manned aircraft: the ability to find and identify targets. Fasten your seat belt. The MQ-9's Cost and Performance Because of Reaper's nature, unit-cost estimates can be tricky. Various media reports cite a per-unit cost from $4 million to $5 million. They are quite incorrect. Because they are integral to Reaper's ability to operate, the ground components for it must be included, and a Combat Air Patrol, or "CAP" (i.e. the specified Reaper operating unit), consists of four air vehicles, not one. Accordingly, the Air Force factsheet for Reaper cites a unit cost not for one air vehicle but for a Reaper CAP ("four aircraft with sensors") at $53.5 million in FY 2006 dollars (which would be $60.3 million in 2012 dollars).[1] But even that Air Force fact sheet calculation is incomplete. It does not include development and other costs that are included in DOD's summary Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs). The latest SAR available (from December 2010) shows a cost of $11.3 billion (in 2008 dollars) for the then-planned total purchase of 399[2] individual Reaper air vehicles and associated ground equipment.[3] In contemporary 2012 dollars that comes to $12.1 billion, which calculates to $30.2 million for each individual Reaper and its share of ground equipment, or $120.8 million for a complete, operable CAP of four.[4] (Given the infrequency at which Reaper flies in comparison to typical combat aircraft, the four Reaper calculation is apt for comparing to manned aircraft. This issue is discussed more in later parts of this series.) The actual cost for a Reaper unit is $120.8 million in 2012 dollars. Given the newly announced reduction in Reaper production rates, the elements that Reaper uses but charged to other programs (summarized in Part 1) and the statement that some additional ground control stations may be bought, the $120.8 million unit cost is an underestimate; however, the data are unavailable to know by how much. Reaper unit cost is well above that of the aircraft frequently compared to it: the F-16 and the A-10. The Air Force's "factsheet" on the F-16C cites an $18.8 million unit cost in 1998 dollars (or $27.2 million in 2012 dollars);[5] GAO cites F-16C unit procurement cost, not including R&D which is not readily available for inclusion, at $55 million per copy.[6] For the A-10, the Air Force factsheet cites no estimate for the unit cost,[7] but GAO cited a total program unit cost (including R&D) at $11.8 million in 1994 dollars (or $18.8 million in 2012 dollars). There have been modifications to the A-10 since that GAO estimate, even if they were to double the cost of the aircraft, it would remain a fraction of the cost to buy a Reaper unit. Reaper is not cheaper to buy than aircraft it is compared to; it is multiples more expensive: from two to six times more costly.[8] Nor is Reaper cheaper to operate, despite initial appearances. Air Force flying hour cost data shows Reaper to cost only $3,624 per hour to fly in 2011 for what the Air Force terms "operational" flying hour costs.[9] That compares to the much higher hourly cost to fly A-10s or F-16s: $17,780 per hour for the newly modified A-10C and $20,809 for an F-16C. However, because each Reaper flies a large number of hours in the air, the math suppresses the per-hour Reaper number. If the calculation is for total maintenance costs over the course of a year for a Reaper unit, the relationship changes: at a per year cost of $5.1 million, per individual Reaper, and at $20.4 million per CAP, the Reaper shows itself to be well above the cost to maintain and operate over a year for an individual A-10C (at $5.5 million) or an F-16C (at $4.8 million).[10] Annual operating unit cost for a Reaper unit is about four times the annual cost to operate an F-16 or an A-10. (end of excerpt) Click here for the rest of the story, on the CDI website. -ends-

Time Magazine's Battleland blog is starting a five part series on the MQ-9 Reaper drone. Specifically, have drones like Reaper caused a "revolution" in warfare, as some respected commentators proclaim? Should they soon replace manned aircraft? Have we heard this rhetoric before? How should drones be evaluated to compare them to aircraft and assess the "revolution"? What is a Reaper? Simply an unmanned aerial drone? Or, is there more to it than that? Finally, what are some of the more, and less, useful sources of information on Reaper? Subsequent parts of this series will address: -- Actual Cost and Performance, -- Ability to Find and Discriminate Targets, -- How Many Reapers and Predators Are There? How Many Have Crashed? and -- Summary and Conclusions: Where Is the Revolution? Part 1: Revisiting the Reaper Revolution (excerpt) In a surprise move this year, the Pentagon has reduced spending for two aerial drones. A version of the RQ-4 Global Hawk will be relegated to storage to be superseded by more capable versions, and future production of the MQ-9 Reaper is to be reduced from 48 per year to 24. The decisions were surprising. Drones are widely touted as the future of warfare. How can it be that the 40-year old, manned U-2 reconnaissance aircraft can do the mission better than even an early-generation drone? The Reaper decision was not attached to any admission of disappointment; it was just a matter of budget constraints and skilled manpower shortages, DOD said. The minor setback with Global Hawk notwithstanding, the aura of a leap-ahead in war-fighting technology is left intact, or so it is to be believed. (end of excerpt) Click here for the first installment of the series, on the Time Battlespace blog. -ends-

PARIS --- Speaking during and after DGA’s annual results press conference on Feb. 22, Lauren Collet-Billon, head of the Direction Générale de l’Armement, and other procurement officials provided details of ongoing unmanned programs. -- The French army fully intends to buy the Watchkeeper UAV developed by Thales UK for the British Army, but this will be preceded by an in-depth evaluation. French army crews will train in Britain this year to operate the system, and will then evaluate Watchkeeper on French territory next year, with a view to awarding a procurement contract by late 2013. -- Two contracts will be awarded as part of Anglo-French cooperation on UAVs. The first, worth about 50 million euros, will cover the assessment phase of the MALE drone, whose service introduction is planned around 2020. This contract will be awarded by France’s DGA on behalf of both countries, and will be overseen by a joint project office based at MoD’s procurement wing in Bristol The goal is to firm up the project’s specifications, the industrial framework – including subcontractors and suppliers - and the development and production plans so the manufacturers will submit an offer for a fixed-price development contract by the end of 2012 or early 2013. -- The second contract, worth about 10 million euros, will fund the initial specifications of the UCAS combat drone. It will define an unmanned combat aircraft that will follow on to the Neuron demonstrator project managed by Dassault Aviation. -- Collet-Billon was dismissive of a future role for EADS in French UAV programs. When asked if the company and DGA were still talking on the subject, he noted that EADS had provided French forces with the Harfang UAV, “and we are in constant dialogue at least on this subject.” -- France has not dropped plans for a rotary-winged UAV, which the French army initially preferred to a fixed-wing design, but this will instead go to the Navy. Larger ships will operate the NH90 helicopter, but there is a need for a rotary-winged UAV to provide a reconnaissance and surveillance capability for ships that have limited available deck space, Collet-Billon said. -- Orders are imminent for minirobots and drones to equip French army combat engineer units, which will use them for itinerary reconnaissance and clearing. -ends-

PARIS --- The ambitious plan announced last week by Britain and France to jointly launch cooperation on unmanned aerial vehicles is unlikely to significantly change the current landscape of Europe’s UAV sector, sources say. While in their Feb. 17 joint statement French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron describe the initiative as a “long-term strategic partnership framework,” the lack of firm funding commitments, and its very circumspect wording, are such that they do not significantly advance plans enshrined in the two leaders’ previous joint statement of November 2010. Little Concrete Progress Since 2010 In fact, little concrete progress seems to have been achieved in the 16 months since the two signed their “Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation” on Nov. 2, 2010. This document called for the two countries to ”launch a jointly funded, competitive assessment phase in 2011, with a view to new equipment delivery between 2015 and 2020” for a Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) UAV. This “competitive assessment phase” has now been downgraded to a “risk-reduction study,” while there is no longer any reference to "equipment delivery," and the target dates have disappeared completely. In the field of Unmanned Combat Air Systems, the 2010 declaration said Britain and France ”will develop over the next two years a joint technological and industrial roadmap. This could lead to a decision in 2012 to launch a joint Technology and Operational Demonstration programme from 2013 to 2018.” The joint roadmap has disappeared from the Feb. 17 statement, as have the target dates for the UCAS demonstration program. This can hardly be considered as progress. The downgrade also extends to the size of the planned investment by the two governments. The risk-reduction study contract due to be awarded shortly for the Euro MALE is estimated to be worth substantially less than 100 million euros over 12 or 18 months, which falls well short of industry expectations as well as of the amount required to achieve meaningful technological progress. In June 2011, when BAE Systems and Dassault made public their cooperation on the Euro MALE, they revealed they had made an unsolicited proposal to Britain and France in July 2010. At that time, the program’s cost was estimated at about 500 million euros for each country, to finance the development, production and operation of a small initial batch of Telemos unmanned aircraft. The second initiative announced last week also falls short of expectations. While it calls for a joint Future Combat Air System Demonstration Program, the two countries have only committed to awarding a contract to begin the specification of this demonstrator, which again falls very short of their previous ambitions. The statement’s emphasis that future needs be met “in a cost-effective manner,” is also interpreted by some as implying that Britain does not exclude going it alone, possibly by launching a competition to select its future UAV, although others say this is simply a sop to the Eurosceptic wing of Cameron’s Conservative Party. But this is not to say that the Feb. 17 is totally meaningless. Political Significance It is of great political significance, for example, that Britain and France have decided to move forward on a bilateral basis which, for the time being, clearly excludes other EU partners. The consequence of the decision to work together to develop a UCAS, albeit for the long term, is that Britain is turning its back on its Eurofighter partners, and France on its Neuron partners, to form a new partnership between two countries that have not cooperated on a major defense program since the 1960s. The agreement also clearly identifies BAE and Dassault as the lead UAV contractors in each country, and implicitly excludes EADS, Thales and other potential players from having any meaningful role in either the Euro MALE or the UCAS programs. This is likely to spark a more visible version of the underground lobbying campaign that has been waged in France over the past year, as it is generally admitted that since future combat aircraft will be unmanned, firms missing out on the Euro MALE and UCAS programs will be unable to continue in this lucrative market. Battle for Survival The battle for survival will continue to pit the BAE-Dassault partnership, which will now develop the Euro MALE, against the EADS/Cassidian group, which is keen to reverse its loss of French UAV business to Dassault, and determined to remain a major player. As prime contractor of Eurohawk; lead company in a European risk reduction study; designer of the Talarion UAV; and provider of the Heron UAV to the German military, Cassidian has in recent months signed agreements with various European firms also eager to play keep a foot the military UAV sector. Cassidian has teamed with Italy’s Alenia Aermacchi; taken over Skycopter, a small French firm; allowed Turkey’s TAI to join its Talarion project and, most recently, taken over the UAV business of Germany’s Rheinmetall group. However, the problem facing Cassidian is that none of these countries has any funds to invest in UAVs, and – perhaps most ominously – it has been shut out of France’s other funded UAV program: the procurement of an interim MALE vehicle, a Heron TP adapted to French military requirements, which also has been awarded to Dassault Aviation in cooperation with IAI. The only real chance for other manufacturers to remain in play, sources say, is if the French government is voted out of office in the presidential elections due in May. The Socialist party, which according to opinion polls is most likely to win, intends to radically reform military procurement, and would probably look to an alternative, pan-European UAV program whose leadership would be more likely go to Cassidian than to Dassault, especially if, as rumored here, outgoing EADS chief executive Louis Gallois is appointed minister for industry in a possible Socialist government. Whatever happens on the political field, the fact is that Britain and France have little to show for the last two years of “strategic cooperation.” Unless they begin to seriously invest in the field of unmanned vehicles they could well end up being distanced by more agile competitors, which would conclusively doom the future prospects of European industry in the field of unmanned aircraft. -ends-

In a move that seems to contradict the Obama Administration's recently announced Asia-Pacific strategy, the Pentagon has decided to mothball its longest-range surveillance drones and rely instead on shorter-range U-2 spy planes. The move is a victory for U-2 maker Lockheed Martin, which argues the U-2 has many more years of operational life remaining on its airframes and offers superior sensor performance due to a higher flight altitude. However, the Global Hawk far surpasses U-2 and other airborne surveillance systems in a facet of performance deemed crucial to the vast distances of the Pacific: endurance. When the president and his defense team unveiled the new Asia-Pacific strategy on January 3rd, they emphasized the role of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems in policing the vast ocean that covers half the Earth's surface. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has also repeatedly underscored the importance of unmanned aircraft in future military plans. Nonetheless, the Air Force offered up the most common variant of the Global Hawk -- the so-called Block 30 -- as a bill-payer in preparing the fiscal 2013 defense budget request, and senior officials have embraced that recommendation. The plan is to retire the Block 30s already in the force and terminate further production. The decision may be couched in a proposal to equip the Air Force with a naval version of the Global Hawk being separately developed at some later date, but insiders say that idea is unlikely to be implemented in the current fiscal environment. Terminating the Air Force version now would also cause a big increase in the unit cost of the Navy variant, due to the loss of economies of scale. Insiders say the Air Force's main motivation for killing Global Hawk is to save money, but that the service failed to conduct an "apples-to-apples" comparison of alternatives including all costs, and also did not credit Global Hawk with being more cost-effective due to its greater productivity. Global Hawk is equipped with a variety of sensors that can collect optical, infrared and radio-frequency intelligence, including video of moving ground targets. Although it only recently achieved formal operational status, it has actually been in use in Southwest Asia supporting U.S. forces since 2001. The long endurance of the air vehicle allows it to monitor vast areas or stay airborne above targets of interest for over a day, beaming vital intelligence to friendly forces via a digital datalink. The U-2 has similar features, including sophisticated sensors that in some circumstances can outperform those on the Global Hawk. But it lacks the "legs" of Global Hawk, a feature that had been thought critical as the joint force shifts its focus to the Asia-Pacific region. U-2 is now expected to remain active in the joint fleet until at least 2023. -ends-